views about the rationale for the recent revival, 3 it provides another opportunity to assess discretionary countercyclical fiscal policy. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to such an assessment by reviewing the impact of the stimulus packages enacted in the past decade.
Methodological Issues in Policy Evaluation
First consider the basic idea behind Keynesian countercyclical fiscal policy as presented-along with alternative views-in college textbooks. A decline in aggregate demand, caused, say, by a decline in investment (I), can be offset by increasing government purchases (G) or temporarily increasing transfer payments or tax refunds. In terms of the Keynesian cross diagram, a shift down in the aggregate expenditures line due to the fall in investment can be countered by increasing government purchases which shifts the line back up. Government purchases-augmented by possible multiplier effects-thus fill the "gap" left by the decline in investment. Countercyclical changes in income tax payments and transfers work the same way except that consumption (C) fills the gap.
Estimated macro models used for policy evaluation-whether Keynesian or new
Keynesian-have this basic mechanism built into them. However, they differ greatly in their predictions of the policy impact because of different assumptions about expectations, the marginal propensity to consume, the degree of consumption smoothing, the speed of price adjustment, and crowding out of other spending as G is raised. For example, Romer and Bernstein (2009) used Keynesian models without forward looking expectations to predict the effect of the stimulus package of 2009-the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)-before it was implemented. They predicted large effects of the package with multipliers around 1.5. In contrast, Cogan, Cwik, Taylor and Wieland (2010) Keynesian model to predict the effects of ARRA before it was implemented. They predicted a much smaller effect, with multipliers averaging 0.5.
The problem with using these existing macro models for the evaluation of actual packages is that they will simply repeat the same prediction story over again. You learn virtually nothing about the efficacy of a stimulus package if you use the same models to evaluate its impact ex post that you used to predict its impact ex ante. Indeed, this is one reason for the disagreement about the impact of the recent stimulus packages. The same models are frequently being used in policy evaluation studies, which are then referred to in many of the debates about policy. 4 To be concrete, consider two models relating the size of the stimulus package S to output Y. Model A is Y= αS +Z and Model B is Y = Z, where Z is an unobservable shock and α is a coefficient which we set to 1.5. Now, suppose that a stimulus is enacted with S = 2, but Y decreases by -1. Then the shock implied by Model A is Z = -4 while the shock implied by model B is Z= -1. Now consider policy evaluation of the stimulus based on a counterfactual where there is no stimulus so S=0. Economists using Model A would say: "Just as we predicted, the stimulus package worked. Without it, Y would have fallen to -4 rather than -1. The decline in output would have been 4 times as deep, a Great Depression 2.0." Economists using Model B would simply say "Just as we predicted the stimulus package did not work." 4 For example, the quarterly impact reports by the Congressional Budget Office (2011) focus on existing models while alternatives models are discussed in the report by Taylor (2010) . An example of how these simulation studies are referred to in the media is the news article by Calmes and Cooper (2009) who wrote "The accumulation of hard data and real-life experience has allowed more dispassionate analysts to reach a consensus that the stimulus package, messy as it is, is working," offering as evidence simulations from the same models which had predicted large impacts of the stimulus package in advance.
One way to tackle this problem is to look at the direct effect of the stimulus packages within the context of the Keynesian paradigm, but without imposing a rigid parametric model structure. This approach has been taken, for example, by economists using micro data to evaluate the impact of transfers and tax rebates on consumption expenditures in the 2001 and 2008 stimulus packages. See Shapiro and Slemrod (2003 , 2009 ), Johnson, Parker, Souleles (2006 , and Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2009) .
In this paper I take this more direct approach, but rather than using micro data I use some informative aggregate data series extracted from the stimulus packages by the Bureau of 5 A number of cross section studies, such as Conley and Dupor (2011) , have examined the impact of ARRA by looking at the "reduced form" effect on employment rather than looking at the direct effects on consumption and government purchases as implied by the Keynesian model. Other studies have used cross section data to examine the impact of some of the smaller-scale interventions, such as the cash for clunkers, which used incentive effects to shift spending forward in time.
Temporary Changes in Taxes and Transfer Payments
The Keynesian argument for temporary tax rebates or transfer payments is that they will increase disposable personal income and thereby stimulate consumption, which will in turn increase GDP and thereby either prevent a recession or accelerate the recovery from a recession already underway. Counterarguments arise from doubts about the reliability and stability of the connection between income and consumption, especially when the increase in income due to the stimulus is temporary. The extension of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) is also included in BEA's ARRA table because ARRA was used as the legislative vehicle for the annual AMT extension in 2009. However, since that extension occurs regularly every year, it is not considered as part of the stimulus package in this study. Figure 1 Though these packages differed in size, duration, and the mechanism for distribution of the stimulus payments 7 , they were quite similar from the point of view of macroeconomics because they were all widely viewed as temporary and were justified on the grounds of stimulating or jump-starting consumption. The 2001 tax rebates could be viewed as an advanced instalment on the more permanent tax cut past that year; the 2009 stimulus had more refundable credits and was implemented in part by a change in withholding. 8 Other rationales are sometimes given for stimulus packages, including that the payments or government purchases are appropriate in their own right. This paper focuses on assessing the Keynesian macroeconomic stabilization rationale for these packages. More precise information about the direct impact of the stimulus payments on consumption can be obtained from regression estimates. Table 1 Quaterly disposable personal income, with and without stimulus, and personal consumption By choosing to put consumption on the left hand side, we are looking for effects of the stimulus payments on consumption, which is where the Keynesian model says we should find them. By splitting disposable personal income into two parts-a temporary part due to the stimulus and the remaining more permanent part-we are allowing for a distinction predicted by the permanent income theory, though we are not prejudging the size of the temporary versus permanent effect. The regressions are estimated over the sample period 2000Q1-2011Q1 which includes the effects of all three stimulus packages. The data are from the BEA table "The Effect of the ARRA on Selected Federal Government Sector Transactions." A small part of ARRA-not shown in the bar chart-was classified as going to the business sector in the form of subsidies and tax benefits, for example for renewable energy or first time home buyers credits, which I do not explicitly consider in this paper. Also, as stated in footnote 6, the extension of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) is not included. The first category, payments to persons, has already been considered. The second category, federal government purchases of goods and services, is part of GDP and thereby contributes directly to changes in GDP. The amount by which an increase in government purchases in a stimulus package raises GDP is of course the government purchases multiplier which has been a subject of much disagreement among economists. From a Keynesian stimulus perspective, the purpose of the third category-sending grants to state and local governments-is to get these governments to increase purchases.
Federal Government Purchases
The most striking finding in Figure 3 is that only a small part of ARRA went to purchases These amounts are too small for the stimulus package to have had a significant effect on the overall economy. In this case the debate over the size of the government purchases multiplier is largely moot because the government purchases multiplier had virtually nothing to multiply at the federal level.
State and Local Government Purchases
State and local governments received substantial grants under ARRA as shown in the bar chart. The purpose of sending these grants to the states was to encourage them to start infrastructure projects and purchase other goods and services. But this is not what happened.
Consider 11 Net borrowing is computed from the changes in financial assets and liabilities in the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds accounts and from state and local expenditures and receipts in BEA's National Income and Product Accounts. Because of the different data sources the two measurers of net borrowing are not exactly the same, differing by a statistical discrepancy. Consider the following three equation system which was estimated over the period from 1969Q1 through 2011Q1:
where G = Government purchases of goods and services E = Expenditures other than for the purchase of goods and services L = Lending or borrowing (-), net A= ARRA grants R = Revenues excluding ARRA grants and where the budget constraint is
The ARRA grants (A) and the other revenues (R) are treated as exogenous, while G, E, and L are endogenous, changing as the states and local governments react to changes in income. The budget constraint places cross-equation restrictions on the system. The coefficients on the ARRA grants and the other revenues variable are constrained to sum to one, and the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables in the purchases and other expenditures equations are constrained to sum to zero. These lagged dependent variables allow for a slow adjustment due to a variety of adjustment costs as the ARRA grants and other revenues are allocated into these two categories of expenditures. The cross-equation constraints were imposed in the estimation of the equations.
All the estimated coefficients (other than the constant) have t-statistics greater than 2.
Note that the coefficient on the ARRA grant variable in the net lending equation is very close to 1, meaning that the direct effect affect of ARRA grants was to lower net borrowing by the same amount as these ARRA grants. Second, note that the coefficient on the ARRA grant variable in the purchases equation is negative while the coefficient on the ARRA grant variable in the other expenditures equation is positive; since the sum of these coefficients must be approximately zero, they are nearly equal but of opposite signs, meaning ARRA had no effect on the sum of purchases and other expenditures.
Counterfactual Simulations with the Estimated Model
To investigate the counterfactual hypothesis of no ARRA program, and thereby illustrate the impact of ARRA, one can simulate the three equation system for the case where A=0. The counterfactual path is compared with the actual path of ARRA grants Figure 5 In each of Figures 6 through 9, the historical data are shown along with the counterfactual simulation. Also shown is the dynamic simulation of the three-equation system; this simulation sets the variable A equal to the actual ARRA grants, but sets the residuals to zero rather than to the estimated residuals. In all cases the dynamic simulations closely track the historical data indicating that the model fits the data well. Figure 6 shows that in the absence of the 2009 stimulus grants, net borrowing by state and local governments would have been greater than it was with the grants. This is consistent with the view that state and local governments tried to smooth their expenditures in the face of temporary changes in income, much as households without borrowing constraints did. were adding significantly to their financial assets as ARRA grants came in. Indeed, it appears that they were saving the grant money rather than using it to increases expenditures.
These data suggest, therefore, that the counterfactual is quite plausible: For net borrowing to have increased in the counterfactual compared with history, it would have been enough for the states simply to have not increased their acquisition of financial assets by as much as they did. To the extent that government purchases had a greater impact on GDP than temporary transfers-which the permanent income theory predicts-then ARRA could have had a negative effect on the economic recovery by reducing purchases and increasing transfers by the same amount. Moreover, according to the simulations in Figure 8 the cumulative negative effect on state and local government purchases was $85 billion. This was nearly three times as large as the $30 billion cumulative positive effect of ARRA on federal government purchases. The results indicate that government purchases were less than they would have been without ARRA.
As early as the summer of 2009 it was becoming apparent that the recovery of the U.S. Others argue that the stimulus was too small, but the results do not lend support to that view either. Using the estimated equations, a counterfactual simulation of a larger stimulus package-with the proportions going to state and local grants, federal purchases, and transfers to individual the same as in ARRA-would show little change in government purchases or consumption, as the temporary funds would be largely saved. Of course, the story would be different for a stimulus program designed more effectively to increase purchases, but it is not clear that such a program would be politically or operationally feasible.
More generally, the results from the 2000s experience raise considerable doubts about the efficacy of temporary discretionary countercyclical fiscal policy in practice. In this regard the experience with the stimulus packages of the 2000s adds more weight to the position reached more than 30 years ago by Lucas and Sargent (1978) and Gramlich (1978 Gramlich ( , 1979 .
